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The selection process of the most valuable player (MVP) in the National Basketball 
Association (NBA) was recently questioned as to whether African-American players were 
treated unfairly based on their race.  Using NBA voting data from the 1995-2005 seasons, we 
develop two empirical models in order to examine the role that a player’s race plays in the 
determination of this award.  Our estimates imply that after controlling for player, team, and 
market characteristics, there is no statistically significant effect of race on the likelihood that a 
player will appear on an MVP ballot or on the number of votes he will receive.      
 
Keywords:  Discrimination, Basketball, Tobit, Probit
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In each of the major professional sports leagues in the United States, the league honors 
one participant with an award signifying that player as being the league’s “most valuable.”  
While the specific means of determining most valuable players varies across leagues, the media 
usually plays some role in the anointment of the league’s top player.  The set of attributes 
associated with the player deemed “most valuable” is open to some debate and, as such, the 
announcement of the recipient is often accompanied with controversy.  Some claim that the 
award recognizes the best player on the best team, while others would argue that the award 
recipient should be the best player in the league regardless of team standings and performance.  
Even issues related to race and market size often are debated by those seeking to gain an 
understanding of the factors that influence voting outcomes.  In this article, an empirical model is 
developed to help shed light on the factors associated with the determination of the National 
Basketball Association (NBA) Most Valuable Player award.  Particular emphasis will be placed 
on the role of the race of the athlete in modeling the voting behavior of media participants.  
The NBA’s most valuable player (MVP) award is named in honor of the league’s first 
commissioner, Maurice Podoloff.  The winner of the Podoloff trophy is determined after a panel 
of members of the basketball media cast ballots.  The size of the panel varies from year to year; 
between 1992 and 2006 (inclusive) the panel size ranged from 96 voters (in 1992) to as many as 
127 (in 2005).  In 2006, the number of voters was 125, with three members from each of the 30 
NBA cities, and the remainder being a mix of national writers and broadcasters (McNeal, 2006). 
Each voter provides his/her ranking of the top five players in the league when casting a 
ballot each year, which is submitted before the start of the post-season playoffs (McNeal, 2006).  
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The points awarded to each player for the award are inversely related to the ranking received.  A 
first place vote is awarded 10 points, a second place vote seven points, a third place vote five 
points, a fourth place vote three points, and a fifth place vote is awarded one point (NBA.com,  
2006).  The number of MVP voting points received by any player in a given year is simply the 
sum of these points and the player with the most points is declared the winner.  The maximum 
number of points any one player can receive is 10 times the number of voters (which would be 
the result if all voters assigned first place to the same player.)  After aggregating vote totals, the 
player with the most points is given the award.   
The player designated as the league’s best benefits in various ways.  Contracts may 
include clauses which call for specific bonuses should a player be named MVP or even if the 
player is significantly recognized in the voting process.  Indirectly, the receipt of such honors 
likely increases player expectations over future earnings. 
Steve Nash, the point guard for the Phoenix Suns, first laid claim to the MVP award in 
2005.  In winning this award, Nash, who is white, edged Miami Heat center Shaquille O’Neal, 
who is African-American, in a very close race.  Almost immediately after the MVP was 
announced, discussions about the role of race in the determination of the award commenced.  
Dan Le Batard of the Miami Herald, the hometown newspaper of runner-up Shaquille O’Neal, 
was one of the first to launch the debate:  
“No one who looks or plays like Steve Nash has ever been basketball's MVP. Ever. In 
the history of the award, a tiny, one-dimensional point guard who plays no defense 
and averages fewer than 16 points a game never has won it. But Nash just stole 
Shaquille O'Neal's trophy, even though O'Neal had much better numbers than Nash 
in just about every individual statistical measurement except assists, so it begs the 
question: Is this as black and white as the box-scores that usually decide these 
things?” 
 Le Batard (2005) 
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The primary purpose of this paper is to attempt to answer the question of whether race 
has played a role in the determination of the NBA’s MVP award.  We also investigate the 
primary determinants of winning the award and evaluate whether some of those measures are 
correlated with a player’s race. We examine historical data on voting outcomes, player 
characteristics, player and team performance measures and market information over 11 seasons, 
from 1994-1995 through 2004-2005, to develop models of voting behavior.  We then use these 
models to assess whether race has been related to MVP voting behavior. 
 
II. Literature Review 
Questions regarding the role of racial discrimination in professional sports are not new in 
academe.  In labor markets, Becker (1957) demonstrates that discriminatory behavior in hiring 
practices would be inefficient under competitive pressure because qualified applicants would be 
passed over in favor of less qualified applicants.  Testing this notion, Gwartney and Haworth 
(1974) found a positive relationship existed between the number of black players on rosters and 
number of games won for all teams between 1950 and 1959, and used this evidence to support 
their claim of labor market discrimination.  Hannsen (1998) examines, using data from the early 
1950’s to present, the relationship between the extent of black player representation on Major 
League Baseball (MLB) rosters and firm performance and also finds results consistent with 
Becker’s model.  Specifically, teams with above average minority representation had 
experienced above average firm performance at the expense of firms with lower minority 
representation.  The magnitude of this effect is shown to diminish over time with increased 
integration of minority ballplayers.  
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Therefore, it would appear that overt racial discrimination is not a rational strategy for 
professional sports owners.  Because of the adverse impact of discriminatory behavior on rents, 
economists generally agree that the persistence of racial discrimination in labor markets is not 
likely in the absence of customer discrimination.  Customers must generally be willing to pay the 
premium associated with the otherwise inefficient use of resources associated with 
discrimination for such practices to persist. In considering the behavior of NBA MVP voting 
media, one might make the argument that incentives may exist for members of the media to vote 
in a manner consistent with the wishes and preferences of their consumers. In this case, 
newspaper subscribers and television viewers interested in matters related to the NBA represent 
the consumer base.   
From the perspective of customer discrimination, Nardinelli and Simon (1990) examine 
baseball memorabilia markets to determine if the race of the athlete associated with the 
memorabilia is a significant determinant of price.  Using limited dependent variable techniques, 
the authors determine that the price of baseball cards is influenced by the race of the athlete 
featured on the card.  Ceteris paribus, the cards for white baseball players cost more than the 
cards for black athletes.  Stone and Warren (1997) examine the market value of basketball 
trading cards, however, and find limited evidence that race significantly impacts card prices. In 
Major League Baseball, votes cast by fans are used to determine the starting lineups for Major 
League Baseball’s All-Star Game.  Hannsen and Andersen (1999) examine the vote totals for 
individual players during each season between 1970-1996 seeking evidence of customer 
discrimination.  Using techniques appropriate for the problem of dependent variable data 
truncation, the authors find that All-Star voting discrimination against black baseball players has 
not only diminished from 1970 to 1996, but has almost reversed. 
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The impact of race in professional sports has not been limited to studies involving Major 
League Baseball.  Kanazawa and Funk (2001) examine Nielson ratings and find that televised 
NBA games receive higher ratings, ceteris paribus, when a larger proportion of white athletes are 
participating.  In effect, this increases the marginal revenue product of the white athlete since 
higher television ratings are associated with higher advertising revenues.  Such findings may 
help to explain the numerous studies that find that there is some evidence of wage discrimination 
in professional basketball.  For example, Kahn and Sherer (1988)  examined data from the mid-
1980’s and found, after controlling for various productivity measures, that white players were 
paid a premium.1  Hamilton (1997), in an effort to determine if the premiums persisted into the 
1990’s, examined 1994-1995 season data and determined that no statistically significant 
relationship existed between salaries of white and black players.  However, isolating salaries in 
the top end of the distribution, the author concluded that there was an 18 percent premium for 
white players, indicative of a “form of customer discrimination in which sports fans prefer to see 
white stars, all else equal.”  Kahn and Shah (2005) continued this line of research and found that 
discrimination is still evident against “marginal nonwhite players.”  In this piece, they concluded 
that no evidence of salary discrimination exists among players who are recent free agents or earn 
salaries that might be affected by rookie salary caps.  McCormick and Tollison (2001) argue that 
evidence of a white-black wage gap in NBA compensation levels might reflect something other 
than customer discrimination.  If black players have lower earning potential outside of the 
basketball and NBA teams hire in a monopsonistic environment, earnings of black players will 
likely be lower. 
                                                 
1 While evidence of salary differentials was uncovered, Kahn and Sherer (1988) determined that race did not 
significantly impact the order in which players were drafted.   
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The rationale for the existence of such premiums might be explained by the work of 
Burdekin and Idson (1991).  They identified an inverse relationship between the number of black 
players on rosters and the attendance and revenues of NBA clubs for the time period between 
1980 and 1986.  Interestingly, no significant relationship between these variables was detected 
between 1969 and 1982.   Kahn (1991) suggests that such a result may be the result of a relative 
paucity of white players in the latter time period.  As white players became increasingly scarce 
across time, the discriminating customer might value their presence, at the margin, at a higher 
level.  Hoang and Rascher (1999) examined data from the 1980’s and found that the increased 
presence of white players on the roster (relative to the white population in the city) was 
associated with increased attendance.  Brown, Spiro and Keenan (1991) have demonstrated that a 
better match between the racial composition of the roster and the racial composition of the city in 
which the team played its home games was significantly related to attendance levels (Brown, 
Spiro and Keenan, 1991).  Burdekin, Hossfeld, and Smith (2005) examine whether this 
phenomenon persisted in the 1990’s.  They concluded that, ceteris paribus, revenues of NBA 
teams with a disproportionately large share of white players were higher in areas with a 
relatively large white fan base.   
Empirical efforts focused on the behavior of media casting hall of fame ballots in 
professional athletics provide a more meaningful framework for the development of our current 
analysis.  In examining MLB Hall of Fame voting behavior of media, Findlay and Reid (1997) 
employ Heckman’s two-step procedure to find that the probability that a black player will ever 
receive a single all-star vote is significantly lower when compared to a similarly situated white 
player.  In the second stage of the procedure, the authors further demonstrate that the total 
number of Hall of Fame votes cast is sometimes a function of, among other things, race or 
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ethnicity.  This provides some evidence that historical discrimination exists among media 
members who cast Hall of Fame ballots.  However, this voting process is distinct from the 
NBA’s process in a critical way.  Baseball’s Hall of Fame selection procedures are by 
construction a two-step procedure, in which those appearing on the final ballot are first screened 
from a larger group of eligible players.2  In contrast, the media members who vote for the NBA’s 
most valuable player each season provide their top choices on a single ballot, and the player who 
receives the most points is anointed the winner. 
 
III. Empirical Model and Data 
Our focus now turns to the development of an empirical model to address the impact of 
race on the behavior of NBA MVP voters.  Because no guidelines are provided by the NBA to 
assist in establishing criteria for voting, we assume that the likelihood of receiving votes is 
largely a function of player and team performance measures; it is possible that other factors, such 
as the market (city) of the player’s team as well as other non-performance related factors, 
including a player’s race, may also impact whether a player receives votes.  That is, voters are 
assumed to consider a number of factors when making this decision, such as a vector of player-
specific performance measures (Playerj), a vector of player j’s team-specific performance 
measures (Teamj), a vector of other factors such as market size and location pertaining to the 
player’s team (Marketj), and a vector of player characteristics that in theory are not accounted for 
in the typical measures of on-court production (Charj).  Included among those non-productivity 
related measures would be the race of player j.   
We assume that voters will evaluate all current NBA players when deciding which one is 
the most valuable.  That is, the voters assign an unobserved MVP rating or “index” to every 
                                                 
2 The specific Hall of Fame voting procedures can be found at http://www.baseballwriters.org/HOF_rules.html 
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player, but since only the top five players on these indices appear on the voter(s) ballots, the 
realization of the MVP index is only observed for a subset of players, specifically those receiving 
MVP votes.  The Tobit model is appropriate in cases where the dependent (latent) variable is not 
always observed.  More formally: 
Votesj = λXj + εj   if λXj + εj > MVP* 
And 
Votesj = 0    if λXj + εj <= MVP*  (Equation 1) 
Where MVP* represents the threshold for including a player on an MVP ballot 
(i.e., ranking among the top five according to a voter’s MVP index) and λXj is the full 
vector of player, team, market and other player characteristics.3 
 An alternative possibility of whether a player’s MVP chances are affected by his race can 
be investigated by examining whether a player’s race affects the probability he will receive any 
MVP votes, i.e., the player will not appear among the top 5 players on an MVP ballot.  That is, 
the alleged discrimination may manifest itself when a voter has to identify the handful of 
potentially most valuable players each year, but not necessarily when it comes to ranking those 
same players on the MVP ballot, the composition of which is already affected by discrimination. 
More formally, the probability that a voter will place player j on his/her MVP ballot is 
determined by the same vectors of player, team, market and personal characteristics described in 
Equation 1: 
Prob(Zj =1) = Φ(β Playerj + γ Teamj + δ Marketj + θ Charj + εj) (Equation 2) 
The data used for the analysis were pulled from various sources.  We collected MVP vote 
totals for all 188 players receiving MVP votes between the seasons ending in 1995 and 2005, 
                                                 
3 That is, i.e., λXj = α  +  Playerj + γ Teamj + δ Marketj + θ Charj. 
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inclusive.4  These seasons encompassed the controversial selection of Steve Nash in 2005, as 
well as the ten preceding seasons.  Each observation in the dataset represented a player-season.  
For example, a player who participated in all 11 seasons during this time period was represented 
with 11 separate observations.  For each player in a given year, the total number of MVP voting 
points was recorded.  As previously mentioned, in MVP voting, points are assigned to each cast 
vote (10 points for a first-place vote, 7 for a second-place vote, etc.).  The number of MVP 
voting points received (and observed in the data) by any player in a given year is simply the sum 
of these points.  
In addition to the 188 MVP vote-getters across these 11 seasons, we also included 
observations for another 2,992 players that did not receive any MVP votes in each respective 
season. The additional observations are for those players who rank among the top ten in scoring 
on their respective teams in each respective season, as we deemed it highly unlikely that any 
player not ranking in the top ten on his own team would be under consideration by MVP voters 
(no such player has ever received MVP votes, much less won the award.)  These selection 
criteria generated a total sample size of 3,180 player-seasons in the NBA during the relevant time 
period. 
For each player included in the analysis, we collected the vector of individual 
performance data (Playerj) from www.databasebasketball.com.5  This rather exhaustive set of 
data included a host of individual performance information including the position of the player, 
minutes played, points scored, rebounds, blocked shots, steals, assists, turnovers, field goals, and 
personal fouls, among others. We converted all player performance data into per-game values.  
One reason for doing so was that per-game data are widely reported in the media and followed 
                                                 
4 An NBA season crosses a calendar year.  Within this paper, the term “1995 season,” for example, refers to the 
season beginning in 1994 and ending in 1995. 
5 At the time we collected the data, this site was named www.basketball-reference.com.   
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by fans (and presumably voters).  Moreover, doing so also allowed us to control for the effects of 
the 1998-1999 strike year, in which only 50 games were played, meaning that any player data 
represented as a season total would have otherwise been adversely affected.  
We also made an additional conversion to the player performance data to better reflect 
the comparison of players within each season.  We converted each player’s game performance 
data into a difference between that player’s per-game statistic and the corresponding best value 
in the league for that particular season.  For example, if player A averaged 20 points per game in 
a given year, and the leading scorer in the league that same year averaged 28 points per game, 
player A’s points per game value was converted to 20 – 28 = -8.  Nearly all game performance 
statistics were constructed such that a higher value was better (e.g., points scored per game, 
rebounds per game, etc.). Thus, our computations meant that nearly all performance statistics 
(e.g., points per game) in a given year had a maximum value of zero (for the player who had the 
best such value in the league for that year), and a negative value for all other players in that same 
year.6  Such a simple transformation allowed for the variable described above, for example, to be 
interpreted as “points per game behind the league leader.”  Also, converting the variables to a 
difference between a specific player and a league leader in that year allows us to combine the 
data from 11 distinct years into a single database.  That is, any annual differences in (average) 
performance are effectively eliminated with this conversion.  Put another way, this method treats 
a player who scored 5 points less per game than the league leader in 1995 the same as a player 
                                                 
6 Similarly, for performance measures such as turnovers and personal fouls in which higher values are associated 
with poorer performance, we constructed the difference such that an increase in this value was “better.”  That is, a 
specific player’s value of these variables was subtracted from the league minimum in that particular season. 
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who scored 5 points less per game than the league leader in 2005, even if the league leader in 
2005 averaged 30 points per game and the league leader in 1995 averaged 20 points per game.7 
We collected the vector of yearly team performance information (Teamj) also from 
www.databasebasketball.com, specifically team wins and playoff appearances in each year.  
Using this information, we created a binary variable representing whether a player’s team made 
the playoffs, a variable representing if his team had the best record in the league in the respective 
year, a measure of the change in his team’s wins versus the previous year, and another variable 
representing the difference between his team’s wins and the top number of wins in the league 
that year.8 
To compute the vector of information associated with teams’ markets (Marketj), we 
collected the size of the television market in each NBA city from Neilson ratings.  These 
included the national rank of the television market, and the number of households with 
televisions in those markets.  We also constructed binary variables reflecting whether the 
player’s team was in an “east coast” market (i.e., New York/New Jersey, Boston, Philadelphia, 
or Washington), in a “large” market (quantified as the aforementioned four markets, plus 
Atlanta, Chicago, Dallas, Los Angeles, and San Francisco), and whether the player’s team 
competed in the Eastern Conference of the NBA.  All of these factors were hypothesized to have 
potential effects on voting due to the preponderance of NBA cities along the east coast, because 
night games from west coast markets suffer from less overall television and other media 
                                                 
7 Besides measures of blocked shots and steals, there are few measures of a player’s defensive prowess.  However, 
voters may also ignore such information when selecting the MVP.  In the 11 years encompassed by our sample, the 
NBA’s Defensive Player of the Year did not win the MVP award, and in six of those years, he failed to receive a 
single MVP vote. 
8 To adjust for the strike year, we pro-rated the number of wins for each team in 1998-1999 to a number comparable 
to a typical 82-game season. 
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exposure due to time zone issues, and because playing in the major eastern media markets yields 
a possible advantage in voting by media. 
The vector of non-performance related player characteristics (Charj) included each 
player’s race, whether the player is international (i.e., whether he was foreign-born), the number 
of years he had played in the NBA, and whether he had previously won an MVP award.  Race 
data were collected by way of visual inspection; thus, it was visual race discrimination that was 
considered in our analysis.  Because we were researching the question of favorable 
discrimination for white athletes, only two categories of race were considered relevant:  white vs. 
non-white.  Photos for nearly every player were available from www.nba.com and were used for 
the purpose of differentiating between white and other races.  The database from 
www.databasebasketball.com also indicates the country of birth for each player.  This provides a 
useful, though imprecise method of classifying players as “domestic” or “international.”9 
Finally, we also computed a term reflecting the effect of a new player on the change in 
the number of wins (from the prior year) for his new team (this term is equal to zero for any 
player that was not new to his team that year).  As will be discussed below, this variable was 
created in order to test the factor cited by many in the media as a likely reason why Steve Nash 
was voted MVP in 2005: in his first year with the Phoenix Suns, the team won 62 games, 
compared to only 29 in the prior year (Associated Press, 2005; Barker, 2005; Kalb, 2006; Le 
Batard, 2005; Wilbon, 2005). This 33-game improvement from one year to the next was the 
third-largest in the history of the NBA, ranking behind only the 1989-1990 and 1997-1998 San 
                                                 
9 For example, Steve Nash was born in South Africa, was raised in Canada, but played collegiately at Santa Clara 
University in California.  Also, Dominique Wilkins, a perennial NBA all-star in the 1980’s and 1990’s, was born in 
France, which would likely surprise most NBA followers.  On the other hand, dozens of players with Hispanic 
surnames were born in the United States.  To classify Nash and Wilkins as “international” players while classifying 
these Hispanic players as “domestic” may be inconsistent with the expected origins of those players on the part of 
the NBA’s customers.  However, to the extent that this measure is equally imprecise for both domestic and foreign-
born players, it remains an unbiased indicator of “international” players. 
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Antonio Spurs (NBA.com, 2005).  The Suns of 2005 were also just the second team in league 
history to win at least 60 games the season after losing at least 50 (Seattle Times News Services, 
2005). 
Table 1 contains some descriptive statistics of the data (across years), but separately for 
those receiving votes in a year from those who did not receive votes.  (For the sake of 
presentation, the per-game player performance statistics shown in the table are not reported vis-
à-vis the league leader.)  First of all, the table shows that that the racial makeup of those 
receiving votes is very different than those that do not, though not in the direction associated 
with discrimination in favor of white players.  That is, on average, white players are less likely to 
receive MVP votes than African-American players.  Further, Table 1 reveals stark differences 
between the performance statistics and team characteristics of players receiving MVP votes and 
those that do not.  For example, MVP vote-getters score more points, garner more rebounds, 
block more shots and distribute more assists than those players who do not receive votes.  None 
of these statistics should be particular surprising, since the award is nominally designed to 
identify the best or most valuable player in the league.   
 Of some interest, however, are the mean values associated with the team-performance 
related variables.  MVP votes are more often given to players on winning teams (especially 
playoff teams) than those on losing teams.  Also, voters are less likely to vote for a new NBA 
player, as shown by the mean value of the YRSINNBA variable.  Players who were traded 
during the season are less likely to receive MVP votes, though this is likely due to the smaller 
likelihood of a team trading a player that might be considered among the league’s most valuable 
in the first place. 
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 More surprising are the descriptive statistics for the market-related variables.  Players 
receiving MVP votes are less likely to be found in the largest TV markets (BIGMARKET) and 
less likely to play for a team found on the East Coast or in the Eastern Conference.  Taken 
together, these descriptive statistics would decry the existence of any sort of “east coast” bias in 
MVP balloting.  Further, players receiving MVP votes play in smaller television markets than 
those who do not receive MVP votes.    
 
IV. Empirical Model Development and Results 
To isolate the causal effect of these variables, including race, on MVP voting behavior, 
several Tobit and probit regressions were estimated.  In both cases, the results from three 
specifications are shown.  The first specification includes only the player-related performance 
variables, whereas the second specification adds the team and market-related variables.  The 
third specification then includes the measures of player characteristics which are presumed to be 
unrelated to on-court performance.  However, since the primary question to be addressed is the 
effect of race on MVP voting behavior, the race variable is included in each of the first three 
specifications, though we have classified it as a non-performance related characteristic.  
Moreover, in order to further distinguish the effect of race between players born in the United 
States and elsewhere, we have also included the binary variable indicating whether the player 
was born outside the United States in each specification.   
Table 2 shows the results from the Tobit regressions.  As can be seen, the variable 
measuring race (WHITE) is not statistically significant10 in any of the specifications in which it 
is included.  This suggests that after controlling for team and player performance measures, as 
                                                 
10 All p-values shown in the Tables are two-tailed probabilities. We used 10% as our threshold for statistical 
significance. 
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well as market information and other player characteristics, there is no statistical support for the 
allegation of a racial animus in the balloting.   
In the first specification, which includes only the player performance variables,11 the 
signs of the coefficients are generally in the expected direction.  For example, players who score 
more points (DIFFPPG), collect more rebounds (DIFFRPG), and distribute more assists 
(DIFFAPG) are statistically significantly more likely to garner more MVP votes.  This is 
consistent with the descriptives statistics shown in Table 1.  Among players at the center 
position, having more blocked shots (DIFFBLKPG*CENT) is also a significant predictor of 
MVP votes.  This effect is not statistically significant among forwards or guards (the omitted 
position category).  Similarly, forwards who gather more rebounds are more likely to receive 
MVP votes.12 
In the second specification, team performance factors and market-related variables are 
added to the estimated equation.  The coefficients indicate, not surprisingly, that players on 
teams with more wins (DIFFWIN and BESTREC) and teams that increased their win total from 
the prior season (WINCHG) are statistically more likely to receive more MVP votes, which is 
again consistent with the mean values shown in Table 1.  In contrast, none of the market related 
effects are shown to be statistically significant determinants of MVP votes, such as the rank of 
the television market, or whether the team is considered to be on the “east coast” or in a large 
television market. 
                                                 
11 In alternate specifications, we measured the player performance measures relative to the position leader in each 
season, rather than the league leader.  However, those models were always inferior to the models presented in Tables 
2, 4 and 6, as measured by the log-likelihood.  The specific results from those models are available upon request.  
12 The player’s position (Guard, Forward, or Center) was included in each of the first three specifications in order to 
properly distinguish differences that may exist in the eyes of voters with respect to certain player performance 
measures.  For example, a guard who scores points may be evaluated differently with respect to being the most 
valuable player than a center who scores the same amount of points per game.  To that end, we also interacted these 
position variables with the primary measures of a player’s on-court performance:  points per game, rebounds per 
game, assists per game, blocked shots per game, and steals per game.    
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The third specification shows the results when all variables are considered, including 
those characterized as non-performance related.  We find that players with more NBA tenure are 
more likely to receive MVP votes,13 as are those ranked higher among the top scorers on their 
own team.  Of particular interest is the interaction term (NEWHELP) between the increase in the 
team’s number of wins from the prior season and if the player is in his first year with the team.  
As mentioned previously, when Steve Nash won the MVP in 2005 after his first year with the 
Phoenix Suns, one commonly cited reason was the improvement in the team’s performance from 
the prior season: with Nash as the starting point guard, the Suns won 33 more games than in the 
2003-2004 season.  The coefficient is positive, as expected, and highly statistically significant (p-
value of 0.2%).   
An alternative approach to investigate the presence of possible race discrimination in 
MVP voting is to estimate the number of MVP votes for white players using the coefficients 
estimated from a sample of only non-white players.14  If white players are indeed being favored 
in the balloting process, then their estimated number of votes from a non-white player model 
should be lower than what they actually received, based on the assumption that their 
performance statistics are being treated more favorably than an otherwise equivalent non-white 
player.  Table 3 shows the difference between the actual and predicted15 number of MVP votes 
for the 18 white players who received at least one MVP vote, based on the coefficients estimated 
from the specification 3 of the Tobit model, but limited to non-white players (n=2,588).  As can 
be seen, one-third of the white players received more MVP votes than predicted, including Steve 
                                                 
13 While both Wilt Chamberlain and Wes Unseld won the MVP award as rookies in 1960 and 1969, respectively, 
none of the rookies in our sample was selected as MVP. 
14 We followed the approach developed by Oaxaca (1973).  An anonymous referee also suggested the estimation of 
coefficients using only white players, but the relatively smaller sample size prevented convergence. 
15 The predicted (expected) values from the Tobit model were calculated as:  E(Votesj) = Φ(x´jβ / σ ) · (x´jβ + σλj), 
where λj is the ratio of the standard normal probability density and cumulative  standard normal distribution 
functions, evaluated at x´jβ / σ. 
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Nash’s controversial MVP selection in 2005.  However, the remaining 67% of white players 
shown in Table 3 received fewer votes than predicted.  On average, these 18 players received 
11.4 fewer MVP votes than would what be expected from their performance and other statistics, 
using the same “returns” to those factors as received by non-white players.  Among all 592 white 
players in the sample, including those who did not receive any MVP votes, the average white 
player received 1.6 fewer MVP votes than would have been predicted. 
While the Tobit results show no evidence of racial animus in MVP balloting, it is 
possible that such discrimination may take a slightly different form, i.e., a player’s race may be 
related to the probability of even appearing on an MVP ballot.  That is, since the number of votes 
related to a fifth place vote is rather small (1 point) compared to not receiving any votes (zero 
points), the Tobit equation may not sufficiently distinguish these two very different balloting 
outcomes.  
Table 4 shows the results of the probit model measuring the factors associated with a 
player appearing on an MVP ballot (i.e., he received any MVP votes).  As before, three 
specifications were estimated, following the same procedures as shown in Table 2.  The results 
from all of these specifications are consistent with the Tobit model:  there is no evidence that a 
player’s race affects the probability he will appear on a voter’s MVP ballot.  In fact, the p-value 
associated with the race variable is not lower than 33% in any of the specifications in which it is 
included.   
Not unexpectedly, the factors that lead to an appearance on an MVP ballot are often 
similar to those that lead to additional MVP votes:  players who score more points, collect more 
rebounds, and block more shots (DIFFBLKPG) are more likely to receive MVP votes.  
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Additionally, given that the past 11 MVPs have included guards, forwards and centers,16 it is not 
surprising that we did not find any direct effect of position on the likelihood of receiving MVP 
votes.    In contrast to the third Tobit model, the third specification of the probit model shows 
that players who play for one of the five “East Coast” teams are significantly less likely to 
receive MVP votes, while higher values for NEWHELP does not statistically affect the 
probability of receiving at least one MVP vote.  Also, players on teams that make the playoffs 
tend to receive at least one MVP vote, while this factor appears irrelevant to how many 
additional votes they may receive beyond that. 
 
V.  Revisiting the MVP Selection of 2005 
Table 5 shows the predictive accuracy of the Tobit model specifications in predicting the 
MVPs.  The third specification correctly predicts eight of the past 11 winners, though the 
controversial selection of Steve Nash in 2005 is not among them.  Instead, this model predicts 
Shaquille O’Neal to be the winner.  A review of the predicted number of votes from this 
specification of the Tobit model shows that the Steve Nash was predicted to finish third in the 
voting, behind Allen Iverson, who like Shaquille O’Neal, is also African-American.  Yet, as 
previously shown in Tables 2 and 4, there is no statistical support to the claim that Nash unfairly 
accumulated MVP votes because of his race—in fact, the point estimates of WHITE in the third 
Tobit specification is negligible (3.63) and is not statistically significantly different from zero.  
Additionally, even when including the modest effect of being an international player, which is 
                                                 
16 As can be seen in Table 5, four of the past 11 MVP winners in the sample were guards, five were forwards and 
two were centers. 
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positive but statistically insignificant, the collective marginal benefits of these two factors are not 
sufficient enough to account for his MVP “margin of victory.”17 
As mentioned previously, when Steve Nash won the MVP in 2005 after his first year with 
the Phoenix Suns, one commonly cited reason was the improvement in the team’s performance 
from the prior season: with Nash as the starting point guard, the Suns won 33 more games than 
in the 2003-2004 season.  While the Tobit and probit models include just such a measure 
(NEWHELP), it is possible that there is an exponential value in MVP balloting associated with 
this effect.  To determine this, we re-estimated the third specification of the Tobit model, but 
added the squared value of NEWHELP.18  Those results are presented in Table 6 as specification 
4.  As can be seen, with the inclusion of the squared term (NEWHELP2), the coefficient on the 
linear effect of NEWHELP becomes negative.  The estimated coefficient on NEWHELP2 is 
small, so at first inspection, it would appear that the effect would be rather innocuous.  However, 
in the case of Steve Nash, the 33-game turnaround in wins for his new team translates to 533 
more predicted votes19 than an otherwise equivalent player who was either not new to his team or 
if new, did not change the team’s win total from the prior year.  To put that effect into 
perspective, Nash’s actual margin of victory was only 34 votes.  Not surprisingly then, Steve 
Nash is forecasted to be the MVP winner in the 2005 season with the inclusion of this squared 
term.  This specification correctly predicts nine of the past 11 MVP winners. 
It is entirely possible, however, that the magnitude and statistical significance of 
NEWHELP and the squared term is driven by the extreme value Nash garnered for this variable 
                                                 
17 The sum of the coefficients relating to race (3.63) and international (18.31) are less than the 34 point difference 
between Nash and O’Neal in 2005.  These coefficients were not adjusted for censoring, as both Nash and O’Neal 
received MVP votes. 
18 Since NEWHELP can be both positive or negative, depending on whether the team won or lost more games 
compared to the prior year, the squared value of NEWHELP was then multiplied by negative one if NEWHELP was 
less than zero. 
19 Calculated as 33*33*0.75 less 33*8.6, which equates to 532.95.   
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in 2005.  To test this, we re-estimated specification 4 in Table 6, but excluded the 2004-2005 
season from the analysis and also omitted the WHITE variable.  Those results are shown in 
Table 6 as specification 5.  As can be seen, both the linear and squared effects of NEWHELP are 
statistically significant at the 10% level.  Further, this specification correctly forecasts eight of 
the past ten MVP winners in that sample.  The coefficients from this specification were then used 
to predict the MVP winner for the 2004-2005 season:  Steve Nash.  Therefore, it is unlikely that 
Nash’s extreme value related to this variable in 2004-2005 is driving the statistical significance 
of the estimated parameters in Specification 3.  Further, since the race variable was excluded 
from this specification, Nash’s predicted vote totals in 2004-2005 were unaffected by his race.   
Still, the sheer magnitude of the effect from NEWHELP seems unreasonable and calls for 
further investigation.  The data show that in the 11 years of voting data included in this study, not 
only did Steve Nash have the highest value of NEWHELP among those players receiving MVP 
votes, he also was the only white player with a positive value of NEWHELP in that group as 
well.  It seems more likely that this data point represents an outlier,20 and the variable itself may 
be highly correlated with race.  If so, then the multicollinearity could lower the estimated 
standard error for the race variable, leading to a conclusion of an insignificant racial effect when 
in fact one exists. 
We tested for multicollinearity in two ways.  First, we estimated simple (Spearman) 
correlation coefficients between NEWHELP (as well as all other variables in specification 3) and 
race, specifically if a player is white.  Those results are shown in Table 7.  The correlations were 
calculated for both the full sample and for the subset of players who receive MVP votes.  
Regardless of the sample, however, the correlation between race and NEWHELP is not 
                                                 
20 The next highest value of NEWHELP belonged to Jason Kidd, in 2002, when the New Jersey Nets’ won an 
additional 26 games in the first year Kidd played with the team.  Nash’s value of NEWHELP is 27% higher than 
Kidd’s, and 2,474% higher than the average player who receives MVP votes.   
 - 23 -
statistically significant at conventional levels.  The correlations do show, however, that some of 
the player performance related measures, such as points per game, are correlated with race 
among those receiving MVP votes.   
Second, we re-estimated the fifth specification in Table 6 without the NEWHELP 
variables, but added the race variable back into the model.   Those results are shown in 
specification 6 of Table 6.  If the NEWHELP variable was acting as a proxy for white players, 
then the removal of NEWHELP should result in a (more) significant racial effect.  However, the 
results show that the race variable is even less statistically insignificant.  Not surprisingly, not 
including NEWHELP in the model lowers its explanatory power, at least when compared with 
the fourth and fifth specifications.  The model correctly identifies eight of the past 11 MVP 
winners; Steve Nash is not among them.  In fact, with the race variable in the model to capture 
any racial bias hypothesized to be in his favor, but without the NEWHELP measure, Nash is 
predicted to finish eighth; of the seven players predicted to finish in front of him, six of those 
were African-American.  Once again, the charges of racial discrimination against African-
American players are not supported by the data.   
VI. Conclusion 
 The designation of the most valuable player in the NBA has been the source of some 
controversy in recent years.  Some have argued that race has played a role in the determination of 
the winner, in the wake of the controversial selection of Steve Nash in 2005.  Using two different 
estimation methods when examining player and team data from 1995 through 2005, we found no 
evidence that discrimination exists in either the act of receiving any MVP votes or the ultimate 
level of support received from voters.  In the case of Steve Nash in 2005, the exceptional 
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improvement in team wins associated with his addition to the Phoenix Suns appears to explain 
his selection by voters.   
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Players, 1995-2005 Seasons. 







WHITE Race=Caucasian indicator 19.2% 9.6% 
INTERNATIONAL Player was born outside of USA 9.8% 14.9% 
GUARD Position=Guard 42.8% 42.6% 
FORWARD Position=Forward 42.7% 40.4% 
CENTER Position=Center 14.5% 17.0% 
PPG a Points scored per game 9.8 21.4 
RPG a Total rebounds per game 4.3 7.7 
APG a Assists per game 2.2 4.7 
BLKPG a Blocked Shots per game 0.5 1.1 
STLPG a Steals per game 0.8 1.4 
FGMPG a Field goals made per game 3.7 7.9 
TURNPG a Turnovers per game 1.5 2.8 
FOULPG a Personal Fouls per game 2.3 2.6 
RANK  Scoring rank on team (1=highest) 5.7 1.7 
YRSINNBA  Number of years played in NBA 5.1 6.4 
PRIORMVP Player was MVP in a prior season 0.5% 17.6% 
TRADED  Traded during current season indicator 8.7% 1.1% 
WINCHG a Change in number of team's wins from prior season -0.1 4.6 
NEWHELP  
Change in number of team’s wins from prior season, 
if player was new to his team that year (0 otherwise) 
0.0 1.3 
WIN  Games won by team in current season 40.3 51.8 
BESTREC  Best yearly win-loss record indicator 3.7% 14.9% 
PLAYOFFTEAM  Team made playoffs that season indicator 53.3% 88.3% 
CONFEAST  Eastern Conference Indicator 52.1% 43.6% 
TV_HOUSEHOLDS  
Number of household in television market (in 
millions) 
2.3 2.2 
TVRANK  Ranking of teams' TV market (1=largest) 16.1 17.0 
EASTCOAST  
Team's television market is NY/NJ, Boston, 
Philadelphia, Washington D.C. 
17.7% 10.6% 
BIGMARKET  Team is one of 9 largest TV markets 38.5% 30.9% 
a: In the estimation of the models, these variables are recalculated as the difference between the player and the 
league leader that season.  All such variables contain the prefix “DIFF” in the variable name. 
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Table 2:  Tobit Regression Results 
 
 Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 
Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value 
Sample Size 3,180 3,180 3,180 
Log Likelihood -1,461.58 -1,377.23 -1,366.18 
Scale Parameter 268.87 N/A 217.48 N/A 209.72 N/A
Intercept 1504.19 0.0% 1000.51 0.0% 937.15 0.0%
WHITE 40.67 47.4% -0.38 99.4% 3.63 94.6%
INTERNATIONAL 43.89 45.0% 17.08 74.1% 18.31 72.6%
CENTER (CENT) 269.66 49.7% 111.15 75.3% 11.39 97.5%
FORWARD (FWD) 284.74 22.4% 325.02 12.4% 313.11 13.3%
DIFFPPG 67.90 0.0% 63.52 0.0% 62.92 0.0%
DIFFRPG 36.94 0.5% 28.82 1.2% 28.73 1.2%
DIFFAPG 58.24 0.0% 44.84 0.0% 40.38 0.0%
DIFFBLKPG 15.43 79.3% -33.55 52.8% -29.87 56.8%
DIFFSTLPG 71.75 13.0% 46.72 27.8% 56.46 19.2%
DIFFTURNPG 62.37 4.8% -28.36 35.8% -33.85 27.0%
DIFFFOULPG 168.16 0.0% 143.77 0.0% 143.26 0.0%
DIFFFGMPG -41.54 4.6% -38.17 4.4% -44.23 1.8%
DIFFPPG*CENT 10.46 23.2% -2.04 79.9% -2.38 76.7%
DIFFPPG*FWD -0.51 94.4% -6.13 36.8% -7.31 27.7%
DIFFRPG*CENT -2.27 93.5% 17.17 50.3% 12.37 61.7%
DIFFRPG*FWD 38.42 1.7% 28.70 4.3% 23.88 8.7%
DIFFAPG*CENT -9.90 80.4% -15.87 65.1% -11.46 74.3%
DIFFAPG*FWD -11.47 54.2% -14.21 39.9% -13.41 41.6%
DIFFBLKPG*CENT 187.23 2.4% 178.11 1.7% 171.84 1.8%
DIFFBLKPG*FWD 62.17 34.7% 107.39 7.5% 125.18 3.4%
DIFFSTLPG*CENT -176.89 16.0% -204.93 6.8% -250.49 2.5%
DIFFSTLPG*FWD -76.94 32.9% -49.97 49.0% -65.59 35.7%
WINCHG --- --- 4.66 0.1% 3.75 1.1%
DIFFWIN --- --- 9.81 0.0% 9.46 0.0%
BESTREC --- --- 166.09 0.0% 162.97 0.0%
PLAYOFFTEAM --- --- 43.17 36.5% 39.39 40.1%
CONFEAST --- --- 38.56 22.0% 42.10 17.1%
TV_HOUSEHOLDS --- --- 0.00 97.6% 0.00 82.4%
TVRANK --- --- 1.57 37.0% 1.23 47.4%
EASTCOAST --- --- -74.80 19.6% -89.20 12.0%
BIGMARKET --- --- -4.38 93.0% 8.55 86.3%
NEWHELP --- --- --- --- 8.60 0.2%
RANK --- --- --- --- -21.98 7.1%
YRSINNBA --- --- --- --- 11.04 1.6%
TRADED --- --- --- --- 7.27 93.8%
PRIORMVP --- --- --- --- 2.88 95.5%
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Table 3:  Oaxaca Decomposition Results  
Predicted MVP Votes of White Players with MVP Votes Based on Coefficients 








Steve Nash Phoenix 2005 1066 277.7 788.3
Pedrag Stojakovic Sacramento 2004 281 172.9 108.1
John Stockton Utah 1996 12 3.4 8.6
John Stockton Utah 1995 47 40.6 6.4
Arvydas Sabonis Portland 1999 3 0.4 2.6
Rik Smits Indianapolis 1998 2 1.9 0.1
John Stockton Utah 2001 1 2.2 -1.2
Steve Nash Dallas 2002 5 12.5 -7.5
Tom Gugliotta Minnesota 1997 1 12.7 -11.7
John Stockton Utah 1997 3 16.1 -13.1
John Stockton Utah 1998 5 44.6 -39.6
Dirk Nowitzki Dallas 2005 349 396.2 -47.2
Steve Nash Dallas 2003 1 72.0 -71.0
Andrei Kirilenko Utah 2004 2 75.2 -73.2
Dirk Nowitzki Dallas 2004 4 155.6 -151.6
Pedrag Stojakovic Sacramento 2002 1 158.5 -157.5
Dirk Nowitzki Dallas 2002 31 190.0 -159.0
Dirk Nowitzki Dallas 2003 43 429.5 -386.5
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Table 4:  Probit Regression Results 
 
 Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 
Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value 
Sample Size 3,180 3,180 3,180 
Log Likelihood -288.24 -221.48 -217.97 
Percent of MVP vote getters 
correctly classified 
94.2% 95.2% 92.0% 
Percent of non-MVP vote 
getters correctly classified 89.0% 91.7% 94.7% 
Intercept 7.34 0.0% 6.36 0.0% 5.87 0.0%
WHITE 0.21 33.2% 0.07 80.2% 0.08 77.1%
INTERNATIONAL 0.09 71.8% -0.07 81.4% -0.07 82.6%
CENTER (CENT) 1.44 23.0% 0.78 54.5% 0.59 65.8%
FORWARD (FWD) -0.66 37.1% -0.34 67.8% -0.32 70.3%
DIFFPPG 0.30 0.0% 0.32 0.0% 0.29 0.0%
DIFFRPG 0.16 0.0% 0.18 0.0% 0.18 0.0%
DIFFAPG 0.21 0.3% 0.15 4.6% 0.14 6.3%
DIFFBLKPG 0.42 0.2% 0.34 2.5% 0.34 2.6%
DIFFSTLPG 0.35 11.2% 0.29 25.2% 0.24 36.0%
DIFFTURNPG 0.20 13.0% -0.18 25.7% -0.23 16.7%
DIFFFOULPG 0.60 0.0% 0.62 0.0% 0.65 0.0%
DIFFFGMPG -0.24 0.5% -0.26 0.9% -0.26 1.1%
DIFFPPG*CENT 0.06 4.5% 0.02 59.5% 0.01 72.7%
DIFFPPG*FWD -0.05 2.2% -0.04 8.2% -0.04 9.1%
DIFFRPG*CENT -0.11 15.3% -0.07 43.0% -0.08 37.1%
DIFFRPG*FWD 0.12 1.5% 0.10 7.1% 0.10 6.5%
DIFFAPG*CENT 0.03 79.8% 0.03 81.3% 0.05 73.1%
DIFFAPG*FWD -0.06 42.7% -0.10 25.9% -0.11 19.1%
DIFFBLKPG*CENT 0.39 5.7% 0.31 18.5% 0.30 19.7%
DIFFBLKPG*FWD -0.20 18.1% -0.03 88.6% -0.02 92.8%
DIFFSTLPG*CENT -0.03 93.4% -0.14 76.4% -0.23 63.7%
DIFFSTLPG*FWD 0.10 71.8% 0.14 64.5% 0.19 55.4%
WINCHG   0.03 0.0% 0.03 0.1%
DIFFWIN   0.04 0.0% 0.04 0.1%
BESTREC   0.63 2.6% 0.66 2.2%
PLAYOFFTEAM   0.41 8.7% 0.42 8.2%
CONFEAST   0.06 70.5% 0.08 63.8%
TV_HOUSEHOLDS   0.00 46.2% 0.00 40.2%
TVRANK   0.00 78.0% 0.00 97.9%
EASTCOAST   -0.55 5.9% -0.62 3.8%
BIGMARKET   0.16 51.9% 0.20 42.1%
NEWHELP     0.00 76.2%
RANK     -0.11 6.3%
YRSINNBA     0.04 6.8%
TRADED     -0.02 95.9%
PRIORMVP     -0.06 87.4%
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Table 5:  Comparison of NBA MVPs with Predictions from Tobit Models 
Year of  







1995 David Robinson (C) David Robinson David Robinson David Robinson 
1996 Michael Jordan (G) David Robinson Michael Jordan Michael Jordan 
1997 Karl Malone (F) Shaquille O’Neal Michael Jordan Michael Jordan 
1998 Michael Jordan (G) Shaquille O’Neal Karl Malone Michael Jordan 
1999 Karl Malone (F) Shaquille O’Neal Tim Duncan Karl Malone 
2000 Shaquille O’Neal (C) Shaquille O’Neal Shaquille O’Neal Shaquille O’Neal
2001 Allen Iverson (G) Shaquille O’Neal Tim Duncan Shaquille O’Neal
2002 Tim Duncan (F) Tim Duncan Tim Duncan Tim Duncan 
2003 Tim Duncan (F) Shaquille O’Neal Tim Duncan Tim Duncan 
2004 Kevin Garnett (F) Kevin Garnett Kevin Garnett Kevin Garnett 
2005 Steve Nash (G) Kevin Garnett Allen Iverson Shaquille O’Neal
Number of Winners 
Correctly Predicted 4 6 8 
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Table 6:  Alternate Tobit Regression Results 
 
 Specification 4 Specification 5 Specification 6 
Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value 
Sample Size 3,180 2,880 3,180 
Log Likelihood -1,361.92 -1,225.00 -1,370.88 
Scale Parameter 205.81 N/A 190.67 N/A 214.13 N/A
Intercept 893.72 0.0% 963.84 0.0% 924.21 0.0%
WHITE -1.74 97.4% --- --- 1.63 97.6%
INTERNATIONAL 7.91 87.8% -31.69 49.2% 27.15 61.0%
CENTER (CENT) 66.05 84.9% 2.31 99.5% -76.14 83.6%
FORWARD (FWD) 350.24 8.8% 415.02 4.6% 267.04 20.7%
DIFFPPG 62.86 0.0% 61.25 0.0% 59.57 0.0%
DIFFRPG 26.03 2.1% 27.27 1.1% 30.26 0.9%
DIFFAPG 40.86 0.0% 34.55 0.1% 41.51 0.0%
DIFFBLKPG -36.94 47.5% -32.76 51.8% -26.13 62.2%
DIFFSTLPG 59.56 16.3% 70.37 9.2% 55.37 20.5%
DIFFTURNPG -32.96 27.5% -48.49 11.4% -38.52 22.0%
DIFFFOULPG 139.61 0.0% 155.01 0.0% 142.90 0.0%
DIFFFGMPG -45.05 1.5% -49.98 1.1% -38.36 4.2%
DIFFPPG*CENT -3.13 69.2% 1.02 90.3% -0.79 92.3%
DIFFPPG*FWD -7.50 26.2% 2.44 71.8% -6.42 35.0%
DIFFRPG*CENT 17.34 47.0% 5.21 82.9% 14.19 57.5%
DIFFRPG*FWD 25.84 6.1% 23.59 7.9% 24.11 9.0%
DIFFAPG*CENT -14.02 68.5% -13.90 67.9% -16.78 63.8%
DIFFAPG*FWD -16.44 31.3% -21.94 18.7% -16.31 33.3%
DIFFBLKPG*CENT 176.42 1.4% 129.14 6.3% 167.51 2.3%
DIFFBLKPG*FWD 135.98 2.0% 159.65 0.6% 113.84 5.8%
DIFFSTLPG*CENT -242.02 2.6% -224.10 4.3% -271.19 1.8%
DIFFSTLPG*FWD -70.49 31.3% -101.01 14.8% -63.79 37.9%
WINCHG 3.72 1.1% 4.67 0.2% 5.60 0.0%
DIFFWIN 9.46 0.0% 10.94 0.0% 8.81 0.0%
BESTREC 145.22 0.1% 169.69 0.0% 171.87 0.0%
PLAYOFFTEAM 38.54 40.1% 27.49 55.0% 43.17 36.3%
CONFEAST 45.66 13.2% 51.42 8.6% 44.56 15.7%
TV_HOUSEHOLDS 0.00 77.4% 0.00 43.5% 0.00 84.0%
TVRANK 1.16 49.4% -1.27 46.8% 0.94 59.4%
EASTCOAST -100.43 7.6% -106.67 6.0% -95.62 10.0%
BIGMARKET 19.84 68.5% 9.33 84.7% 3.73 94.1%
NEWHELP -8.60 18.2% -12.45 7.8% --- ---
NEWHELP2 0.75 0.3% 0.87 0.5% --- ---
RANK -25.41 3.8% -24.59 4.3% -20.47 9.8%
YRSINNBA 11.63 1.0% 9.66 3.1% 13.10 0.5%
TRADED -21.06 82.4% -52.71 67.5% 0.91 99.3%
PRIORMVP 3.14 95.1% 4.84 92.4% 6.56 90.1%
Number of Winners 
Correctly Predicted 9 of 11 
8 of 10 in sample; 
9 of 11 overall 8 of 11 
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DIFFPPG -0.12 0.0% -0.24 0.1% 
DIFFRPG 0.00 91.2% -0.16 2.9% 
DIFFAPG -0.09 0.0% 0.10 19.3% 
DIFFSTLPG -0.16 0.0% -0.04 57.7% 
DIFFFOULPG 0.02 25.8% 0.11 12.0% 
DIFFFGMPG -0.11 0.0% -0.22 0.3% 
WINCHG -0.00 95.8% 0.01 90.6% 
DIFFWIN 0.05 0.3% 0.20 0.7% 
BESTREC 0.06 0.1% 0.12 10.8% 
CONFEAST -0.08 0.0% -0.25 0.1% 
EASTCOAST -0.08 0.0% -0.11 12.5% 
NEWHELP 0.00 91.4% -0.03 67.2% 
RANK 11.3 0.0% 0.18 1.3% 
YRSINNBA -0.08 0.0% 0.03 73.3% 
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